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Philosophical Elements in Penrose's and
Hawking's Research in Contemporary Cosmology
Wim B. Drees
This article aims at elucidating the philosophical elements in two
contemporary (post 1975) research programs in theoretical
cosmology. The programs of R. Penrose and S. W. Hawking differ
with respect to their view of the basic structures behind space and
time, the interpretation of quantum physics, the arrow of time, and
the specialness of our Universe. The differences show up both in the
content of their work and in the arguments used to defend their
programs. The present article shows that these differences are
partly of a philosophical (mainly metaphysical) nature, probably
the "dangerous but fascinating territory" mentioned by Penrose. As
far as this conclusion is justified, it supports the general conjecture
that fundamental research programs do have some metaphysical
component, although that is often not explicit. They might be seen
as examples of theories which are "logically incompatible and
empirically equivalent" and hence examples which might have some
relevance to discussions about the tension between "realism" and
"underdetermination". A comparison of two different programs
makes it easier to see some of the implicit or explicit decisions
involved.
13
1. Introduction.
The emergence of quantum physics and general relativity
was accompanied by an intense philosophical debate about
the implications for Kantian and positivistic philosophy, as
exemplified for instance by the volume on Einstein in the
Library of Living Philosophers ([Schilpp] 1949). As I hope
to show in this article, the issues at stake in contemporary
ideas beyond quantum theory and general relativity are at
least as important. However, they have not led to as wide
a discussion. The absence of interest can partly be explained
by the difficult mathematics involved and the enormous
volume of scientific production today. The ideas lend
themselves less easily to popularization, although that surely
will come if the ideas are here to stay. Another reason for
the relative scarcity of attention might be that the programs
are still unfinished.
This article aims at elucidating the philosophical
elements in two contemporary (post 1975) research
programs in theoretical cosmology. The programs of
Penrose and Hawking' differ with respect to their view of
the basic structures behind space and time, the interpretation
of quantum physics, the arrow of time, and the specialness
of our Universe. The differences show up both in the
content of their work and in the arguments used to defend
their programs. The present article shows that these
differences are partly of philosophical (mainly
metaphysical) nature, probably the "dangerous but
fascinating territory" mentioned by Penrose. As far as this
conclusion is justified, it supports the general conjecture
that fundamental research programs do have some
metaphysical component, although that is often not explicit.
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They might be seen as examples of theories which are
"logically incompatible and empirically equivalent" (Quine
[1970]), and hence examples which might have some
relevance to discussions about the tension between "realism"
and "underdetermination". A comparison of two different
programs makes it easier to see some of the imlicit or
explicit decisions involved. However, they each have their
own formalism, use their own language, and that obscures
direct comparison, since apparent differences might be due
to presentation. It would be better to reformulate the
theories as far as possible in a common scheme, as
M.Friedman [1983] has done for Newtonian and Einsteinian
theories of space and time. However, it would not be
feasible to reformulate the ideas of Hawking and Penrose at
this moment. Besides, we are dealing more with "work in
progress" than with a finished product. A further
justification is that they address the same scientific audience
at conferences.
In relying on their own statements there is another
difficulty: a scientist need not be the best interpreter of his
own theory. However, as their proposals are rather
complicated I follow the interpretations given by the
authors. Besides, although upon closer analysis the actual
content of the resulting theories might have different
conceptual implications than those claimed by their
proposers, the statements made by the proposers remain the
most direct source about the ideas involved in the
development of the theories. Hence the article gives my
reconstruction of some methodological and metaphisical
ideas implicit in the work of Hawking and Penrose.
Penrose's approach is sketched in its development from
the early 1970s, concentrating on twistors instead of space-
time points (3.1) and on the arrow of time, the initial
conditions of the universe and the interpretation of quantum
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mechanics (3.2). Then follows a discussion of Hawking's
recent work (since 1982) in quantum cosmology (4.1), and
its implications for his view of time and quantum reality,
and his expectation that physics might be near completion
(4.2). Background information on physics is given in a
preceding section (2). In the final section (5) the scientific
work is presented in the terminology of Imre Lakatos"
methodology of research programs. It is claimed that the
metaphysical component of these research programs can
best be thought of as residing in the "positive heuristic".
The metaphysical elements are also claimed to be much
more like traditional mataphysics than is acknowledged by
Lakatos description of them as contingent propositions
without potential falsifiers.
2. Background Information on Physics.
In theoretical physics the major fundamental theories
are general relativity (GR), quantum theory (QT), and
thermodynamics.
Applying general relativity to the universe as a whole,
space-time has a boundary point where the curvature
becomes infinite, the so-called big bang. Other singularities
arise in the collapse of a heavy star. Singularities are
unavoidable in GR, provided certain general assumptions
(Hawking and Penrose [1970]) are fulfilled. Singularities
are naked or, as black holes, have horizons. In the latter
case, everything inside remains trapped forever, so the core
singularity does not influence the external universe. As the
basic equations are time-symmetric, white holes - emitting
singularities - are also thinkable.
Quantum theory describes systems by a wave function,
or equivalently a state vector, which gives probabilities of
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events. The probabilities are squares of comlex amplitudes.
(One complex number is equivalent to two real numbers).
Spin is a characteristic of particles which comes in units of
1/2 . A system with helicity l (one unit of spin) can be in
a state which mixes spin "up" and spin "down", described
by two amplitudes. Penrose refers to this "plane" of
complex numbers as a complex continuum, in this case C2.
As there are vectors in space-time, there can be defined in
C2 a kind of complex vector, a "two-spinor".
The interpretation of QT is still controversial. The
Kopenhagen Interpretation is that the collapse to one
actually observed result is a real effect, induced by the act
of observation (by instruments). Others hold that all
possibilities described by the wave function are equally
actual, the Many Worlds Interpretation. There are more
subtleties as well as modifications of philosophical interest,
but this suffices as background.
Thermodynamics is the only fundamental theory which
makes a physical difference between past and future, and so
has an "arrow of time". Dissipatory phenomena are
summarized in the Second Law: a mathematical entity
called "entropy" increases until equilibrium is achieved.
Although the theories work very well in their respective
domains, a combination is needed both for aesthetic reasons
and for application to certain interesting situations, such as
the very early universe and black hole thermodynamics. In
the case of black holes there is a close analogue of the
Second Law in that classically the surface of the horizon
always increases. Hawking [1975] discovered that a black
hole might produce radiation by quantum effects, now
called Hawking radiation, and thereby evaporate
completely.
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3. R. Penrose's Twistor and Time Program.
3.1. The Twistor Program.
Although the program originated earlier2 an article
published in 1972 is taken as a clear statement about the
program in an early stage.
"On the Nature of Quantum Geometry" [1972].
Penrose objects to the mathematical continuum since it
contains "many features which are really very foreign to
physics" ([1972], p.333). A small volume would contain as
many points as a large volume, or even as the entire
universe, which is unrealistic. There is "the lack of firm
foundation for assigning any physical reality to the
conventional continuum concept" ([1972], p. 334).
According to Penrose the continuum problem is as strong
for quantum theory. His long term policy is "that ultimately
physical laws should find their most natural expression in
terms of essentially combinatorial principles, that is to say,
in terms of finite processes such as counting or other
basically manipulative procedures" ([1972], p.334). Penrose
does not envisage a discrete set of points, but he expects
that "the concept of a space-time composed of points should
cease to be an appropriate one - except in some kind of
limiting sense" ([1972], p. 334). As this also holds for the
other continuum, "quantum theory and space-time theory
would be expected to arise together, out of some more
primitive combinatorial theory" ([1972], p.335). As
motivation Penrose mentioned also "the infinite divergences
of quantum field theory" (Penrose and MacCallum [1973],
243).
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A first prototype: spin networks.
Penrose then describes a model with angular momentum
as the basic entity. It is discrete. The "world" in this model
are line segments with spin. To nmeglect quantum
uncertainty for a system with sufficiently large angular
momentum one can define a direction by means of its
rotation-axis. Once directions are defined, angles can also
be defined. "Thus, the system itself defines the geometry
and the background space is really an irrelevance" ([1972],
p.339). If a system consists of two parts, each defining
directions and angles, it is possible that the two geometries
do not fit together the way an Euclidean background does.
This might represent curvature of space-time.
In an argument not directly related to spin-networks but
essential to the spinor and twistor approach, he introduces
a six-dimensional "space" where each point represents a
whole line (geodesic) of the original space-time. The
geometry of ordinary space-time can be reconstructed out
of this space of points representing lines. Normally, a point
is the intersection of a bundle of lines. However, if there
are different patches of flat geometry, points in one region
will appear "fuzzed out" if the geometrical structure of
another region is used. This can be imagined as the bundle
of lines no longer intersecting at one point, due to the shear
acting on the geodesies.
Penrose explicitly points to unrealistic aspects of the
spin-network model ([1972], pp.338 & 347). Most
important, it is non-relativistic and the mixture of spin and
orbital angular momentum is not treated adequately. Both
problems are related to the neglect of the relative velocities
by paying attention only to angular momentum.
Twistor theory as the next step.
Penrose advances a number of reasons why twistor
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theory might provide a better framework. In using twistors
he specializes to null geodesies: world lines of light and
other massless particles. This is justified by the following
arguments: (1) The space of points representing lines (a)
attains a nice mathematical structure in this approach and
(b) shows a similarity to modern theories of elementary
particles. (2) Null geodesies are conformally invariant, that
is invariant under all angle-preserving transformations like
rotations, translations and scale-transformations. Conformai
transformations preserve the causal structure of space-time.
Rest mass conflicts with invariance under scale transforma-
tions. "In any case, to think of basic physical processes in
terms of either conformai invariance, or the breaking of
conformai invariance, seems to be a fruitful point of view.
To this end, it is very useful to employ a formalism which
makes this conformai invariance manifest wherever it is
present" ([1972], p.347). (3) It is a generalization of the
spin-networks with conformai invariance in stead of
rotational invariance. Therefore we might be able to derive
a similar combinatorial calculus. (4) It overcomes the
difficulties mentioned above in that twistors are fully
specially relativistic and mix spin and orbital angular
momentum in the right way.
Penrose suggests reconciling conformai invariance of
flat space with GR along the lines described above: the idea
that local patches do not fit together in a flat way, cor-
responds to fuzziness (incorporating QT) and curvature
(incorporating GR). "To a considerable extent, the above
program is speculation. Nevertheless, the present state of
twistor theory does have a number of points of contact with
it" ([1972], p.348), as he illustrates in the remainder of that
article.
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Later articles.
The same motives are repeated. The primary aim is the
merging of the two continua (space-time and quantum
probabilities) into one, which would explain the 3-1
dimensionality of space-time. A longer term aim is to
eliminate the continuum concept in favor of combinatorial
principles. Twistor theory clearly follows up the first aim,
but Penrose acknowledges that it is unclear whether this,
even if successful, would provide the reduction of physical
laws to combinatorial rules ([1975], p.273). As far as I
know of, the first time that the interpretation of quantum
mechanics is mentioned is in ([1980], p.288), where it is
mentioned together with the infinities in quantum theories.
The equivalence of the twistor description in terms of
points representing lines and the classical description is
conceded, but they provide radically different views of
quantized space-time. Usually the points are kept intact and
the metrical structure is quantized, which makes nullcones
(and causality) fuzzy. Penrose wants to keep the null direc-
tions well defined (the twistor space of points representing
such lines). Instead, he allows for fuzzy points as intersec-
tions of such lines. "A viewpoint of this kind also fits in
well with a belief (which is itself part of the twistor
philosophy) that spinors are to be regarded as more
fundamental than world-vectors" ([1975], p.275). That
twistor theory works with comlex numbers hints at a
unification of space-time and quantum physics. "Such
unifications and hints at unifications that the twistor
approach provides are, to me, a stronger motivation than
any of the more clear-cut achievements of the theory"
([1975], p.277). Besides, the formal equivalence at the
classical level does not imply that the twistor approach
might not be more useful in certain calculations ([1975],
p.304).
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Twisters are introduced physically as objects consisting
of two spinors (each consisting of two complex numbers)
representing the momentum and angular momentum of a
massless particle of a certain helicity. Such objects are
shown to satisfy a certain equation, the twister equation.
Subsequently, this is turned upside down: twisters are
defined mathematically as the solutions of this equation.
Penrose also gives a geometrical interpretation. My
description, given above, as "points representing lines" is
a simplification. They are more accurately described as
representing fields. For a null-twister (a twister describing
a particle without spin - so helicity = 0; not to be confused
with null-vectors describing massless particles, in this latter
sense all twisters would be null) there is a line where the
angular momentum-component vanishes, hence a line which
can be interpreted as the world-line of a particle without
spin. For other twisters the interpretation is much more
complicated. The image is spread out, describing the
motion of an extended particle.
Adaptation to curved space-time turned out to be
complicated. "It may be felt, indeed, that twisters are not
really appropriate for discussing conformally curved space-
times at all. But to hold such a view would be to abandon
the twister programme as an approach to a more
fundamental description of nature" ([1975], p.372). This
was still a serious problem in 1981, but Penrose continued
to believe in the twister approach ([1981b], pp.580 & 585).
He refered to the seven years that passed between the
twister description of a particle with spin 1/2 and that of a
particle with spin -1/2, a transition which, in retrospective,
was obvious. In 1986 (Penrose and Rindler) they had
achieved a number of results, especially about the energy
and angular momentum of gravitating systems.
The few indications that such a program, including
22
gravitational fields, might be realizable "encourages my
own belief that twisters may reveal a hidden relationship
between classical general relativity and quantum mechanics.
Nature has, after all, chosen to weave her universe from
these two constituents - and from others as yet largely
unknown. Interrelationships must be present that we are
unable now to perceive. And we are blinded not just by our
lack of knowledge; our preconceived notions concerning
space, time and quantum mechanics may be partly to
blame" ([1975], p.403-404).
The basic idea of the twister program is, I hope, by
now clear. The subsequent literature does not add much to
that. The program is of a triple nature:
(a) A reformulation of existing physics in different mathe-
matics. The two formulations are equivalent, except for
sign ambiguities. The twister approach might in some cases
provide an easier way of doing the calculations or suggest
ways of calculating which would not have been found in the
other approach (e.g. Penrose and Rindler [1984], pp. 147-
8).
(b) Although the two aproaches are at a certain (classical)
level equivalent, they suggest different ways for changing
the scheme to incorporate other phenomena or unify
different parts of physics. The traditional space-time-vector
approach lends itself easily to the idea of spaces of higher
dimensionality. The twister approach does not have this,
but suggests a way of relating quantum theory and general
relativity through the effect of fuzzy points when the twister
space gets deformed.
(c) Twisters represent a deeper level of reality than space-
time points. This part of the twister program is committed
to an ontological realism with respect to twisters as
fundamental entities, which are at the basis of both space-
time and particles. The belief in this dual nature of twisters
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is justified by the suggestion that both GR and QT might be
derived from the twisters, that twisters evade the unphysical
character of classical points, etc. Although this is expressed
often in Penrose's work, it is defended more tentatively
than the mathematical value of the twister approach.
In the following, Penrose's work on singularities and
time-asymmetry will be discussed. This has some relation
to the twister program, but is presented independently of
the twister mathematics.
3.2. Time's arrow, the specialness of the universe, and the
interpretation of quantum theory.
Penrose has done much work on singularities in GR. He
described a way to depict an infinite universe in a finite
diagram, while retaining the structure of the light cone,
thereby providing a picture of which points are causally
related. Although this work started in the 1960s, the three
items discussed here became the subject of publications
mainly from 1976 on3. Those items are:
the arrow of time (difference in past and future
directions?);
- the "initial conditions" of the Universe (special?);
- the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Penrose attempts to show how they are related. He
proposes that there is a fundamental law which distinguishes
between initial and final singularities by restricting initial
ones. From this law, an arrow of time follows in a universe
with an initial singularity. In the same framework there
might be a relation between gravity and state-vector
reduction which solves the interpretation problem without
observers and without many worlds. According to Penrose,
the existence of naked singularities would be much more
alarming than the existence of black holes. "For whatever
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unknown physics actually takes place at a spacetime
singularity, its effects would be relevant observationally if
and only if the singularity is a visible one" ([1978], p.230).
He therefore made the cosmic censorship hypothesis that a
physically realistic collapse will not result in naked
singularities [1969]. The crux is the "physically realistic".
This implies that certain solutions of the equations should
have no physical relevance. But "this hypothesis should not
exclude singularities of the big bang type - for otherwise
one would presumably be ruling out the actual universe!"
([1978], p.233).
The problem lies in the conflict between the time-
symmetry in the fundamental local physical laws as
presently known and the manifest time-asymmetry. For the
latter he points to seven arrows of time [1979]: the decay
of the K° particle; quantum mechanical observations,
although they can be formulated as time-symmetric at the
level of subsequent observations; the increase in entropy;
the absence of advanced radiation; psychological
experiences, the difference between memories and the idea
that we can affect the future; the expansion of the universe;
and the difference between white and black holes. "I feel
that such things [white holes, WBD] have nothing really to
do with physics (at least on the macroscopic scale). The
only reason why we have had to consider white holes at all
is in order to save time-symmetry! The consequent
unpleasantness and unpredictability seems a high price to
pay for something [time-symmetry] that is not even true of
our universe on a large scale" ([1979], 610).
Most of the arrows (except for the first and second)
would be explained if there were a reason that the initial
state of the universe was of comparatively low entropy.
Since this cannot be located in the matter it must be in the
geometry. In the beginning there was no clumping, so the
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geometry was Isotropie. Once there is clumping the isotropy
gets lost (e.g. we have a strong sense of the difference
between vertical and horizontal directions, due to the Earth)
as well as the conformai invariance. The absence of
clumping implies vanishing of the Weyl conformai
curvature, which therefore could be used as an expression
for the gravitational entropy. Penrose's hypothesis is that
"there should be a complete lack of chaos in the initial
geometry" ([1979], p.630), more technically: the Weyl
curvature should vanish at any initial singularity.
"Some readers might feel let down by this. Rather than
finding some subtle way that a universe based on time-sym-
metric laws might nevertheless exhibit gross time-
asymmetry, I have merely asserted that certain of the laws
are not in fact time-symmetric - and worse than this, that
these asymmetric laws are yet unknown" ([1979], p.635).
However, "it tells us to look for such asymmetries in other
places in physics" ([1979], p.635), and one such place
might be quantum mechanics. To summarize his position:
There is time-asymmetry present. "It is, to me,
inconceivable that this asymmetry can be present without
tangible cause. ... In my own judgement, there remains the
one ("obvious") explanation that the precise physical laws
are actually not all time-symmetric! The puzzle then
becomes: why does Nature choose to hide this time-
asymmetry so effectively?" ([1979], pp.637-8).
Penrose expresses his view of the beginning of the
universe in terms of entropy. The observed entropy per
baryon (proton, neutron) is about 10', which implies a total
entropy of the observable Universe of 10M . According to
Penrose this is rather low. If all the mass would have been
clustered in solar size black holes, the entropy "per baryon"
would have been of the order of 1020. If the universe as a
whole - assuming for the moment that it is closed and about
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the size observed today - would consist in its final state of
only one black hole, it would have an entropy of 10123,
which he considers "a plausible estimate for the maximum
entropy state of a universe of this type" ([1981a], p.247).
This shows "how absurdly tiny this "observed" figure is in
comparison with what it "might have been". This provides
us with a measure of the degree to which the initial state
was special" ([1981a], p.248). Since entropy is
logarithmically related to the volume in phase space, the
mathematical space of all configurations (one point
representing one complete universe), one could calculate the
specialness of our universe. Imagine such a space W,
"whose points represent the various possible initial
configurations of the universe. Imagine the Creator,
armed with a pin which is to be placed at one spot
in W thereby determining the state of our actual
universe. . . . , we are led to estimate that accuracy of
the Creator's aim must have been at least of the
order of
OO 1001fr° ifr^-310U parts in 10U
(this being the ratio of the volume to be aimed at to
the total volume of W) i.e. one part in
...Without wishing to denigrate the Creator's
abilities in this respect, I would insist that it is one
of the duties of science to search for physical laws
which explain, or at least describe in some coherent
way, the nature of phenomenal accuracy that we so
often observe in the workings of the natural world.
Moreover, I cannot even recall anything else in
physics whose accuracy is known to approach, even
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remotely, a figure like one part in
1012310 U .
So we need a new law of physics to explain the
specialness of the initial state! "
([1981a], pp.248-9.)4.
He discusses an "anthropic explanation", which fails
since then a universe with entropy 10"' would have fitted as
well, and it would have been "a vastly "cheaper" method
than the one which appears actually to have been used"
([1981a], p.254). "Indeed, it would appear from this that
the Creator was not particularly "concerned" about our
existence, but was constrained in some very precise time-
asymmetric way for some quite other reason. From this
point of view, our present existence would arise merely as
a by-product." ([1981a], p.255).
The preceding ideas also bear upon the interpretation of
QT. According to Penrose, there are many more ways for
a black hole to get formed (out of radiation, particles,
television sets, ...)than to evaporate through Hawking
radiation. The evolution of a universe can be described in
a phase space describing possible situations by a point
moving along a trajectory. If the point moves through a
certain subspace there is a black hole present. There are
more trajectories entering the subspace of universes with a
black hole than there are trajectories leaving that subspace.
This implies some trouble - also for the region describing
universes without black holes - since a fundamental
theorem, Liouville's theorem, says that volume in phase
space is conserved, which might also be stated as that
trajectories do not disappear or emerge. If they disappear in
the subspace of universes with a black hole, there must be
trajectories appearing in the rest of phase space.
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This problem might be the clue to the interpretation of
QT. As long as a system evolves according to the
Schrodinger equation, it is described by a single trajectory.
However, if "reduction" takes place, there are different
possible outcomes, so different trajectories escaping from
the region where the reduction took place. "The idea, of
course, is that this volume increase should exactly
compensate for the volume loss in the black hole region"
([1981], p.270). This provides, in principle, a quantitative
link between the gravitational phenomenon of black holes
and the quantum mechanical observation process.
In 1984 Penrose presented further ideas on "gravity and
state vector reduction" [1986a]. Reduction is supposed to
occur if the decrease in entropy involved in the reduction is
at least compensated for by an increase in gravitational
entropy. This seems to have testable consequences, like a
prediction of minimal bubble sizes in bubble chambers, a
measuring device to detect tracks of elementary particles
([1986a], p. 144). As there is as yet no clear expression for
gravitational entropy, the approach is rather tentative. In a
postscript, influenced by R. L. Wald, Penrose suggests that
it should perhaps be phrased in terms of the number of
gravitons. This he later formulated as "that the linear
superposition of states will cease to be maintained by nature
as soon as the states become significantly differently
coupled in to the gravitational field" ([1986b], p.50), where
"significantly different" means "that the difference between
the two Weyl tensors (...) is a spin 2 field whose graviton
number count is at least one graviton" ([1986b], p.50).
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4. S .W. Hawking's Quantum Cosmology Without
Boundaries and Time.
S.W. Hawking has worked on singularities, black hole
thermodynamics, and quantum effects when the curvature
of space-time is large, especially by using the idea of
topological fluctuations ("space-time foam") and Euclidean
path integrals. Hawking summarized his work as "the
problem of constructing a complete and consistent theory
to describe these effects" ([1980b], pp.31-2.). In the present
article, Hawking's application of these methods to the
whole universe is considered. Hawking [1982, 1984a,
1984b] proposed in collaboration with J.B.Hartle (Hartle
and Hawking [1983]) a method to calculate the wave
function of the universe without assuming any boundary
conditions (4.1). In (4.2) the implications for the arrow of
time and the interpretation of QT is discussed, together with
Hawking's expectation that theoretical physics will reach
the end soon, perhaps "by the end of the century" ([1980a],
Boslough [1985], 131).
4.1. The universe without boundary conditions.
The Hawking-Hartle proposal is that one calculates the
wave function describing the probability of finding a certain
three dimensional geometry with matter fields, a universe,
by intergrating over a class of four dimensional extensions,
all with a three dimensional geometry as their only
boundary. This can be done in the case of a closed,
compact three geometry, taking only compact four
dimensional extensions. The use of a compact metric is
essential. "By evaluating the path integral over compact
metrics, one eliminates one of the two parts of physics, the
boudary conditions. There ought to be something very
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special about the boundary conditions of the universe and
what can be more special than the condition that there is no
boundary" ([1982], p.571).
The calculations are complicated and no model
describing our universe with all its fields exists yet. There
are some results, indicating that the density should - at least
in a simplified model - be close to the critical density
(Hawking and Page [1986]) and that most universes of this
type undergo an inflationary phase (Gibbons, Hawking and
Stewart [1987]).
The approach is clearly related to philosophical con-
cerns, both in its view of boundary conditions and in its
interpretations. Refuted is the claim of "many people" that
"the boundary conditions are not part of physics but belong
to metaphysics or religion. They would claim that nature
had comlete freedom to start the universe off any way it
wanted" ([1984b], p.258). According to Hawking, "what
could be more reasonable than the boundary condition that
the universe has no boundary?" ([1984a], p.363). And "if
spacetime is indeed finite but without boundary or edge,
this would have important philosophical implications. It
would mean that we could describe the universe by a
mathematical model which was determined by the laws of
physics alone" ([1984c], p.358f.).
Hawking and Hartle gave the following interpretation:
"One can interpret the functional integral over all compact
four-geometries bounded by a given three-geometry as
giving the amplitude for that three-geometry to arise from
a zero three-geometry, i.e., a single point. In other words,
the ground state is the amplitude for the Universe to appear
from nothing" (Hartle and Hawking [1983], p.2961). But
in the same article they also interpret it as "implying that
the universe could continue through the singularity to
another expansion period, although the classical concept of
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time would break down so that one could not say that the
expansion happened after the contraction" (Hartle and
Hawking [1983], pp.2974-5.). In a subsequent article,
Hawking seems to refer again to the first option, "It may
well be therefore that the observed universe owes its
existence to quantum gravitational effects" ([1984b],
p.275). Something like this is needed, "if we want to
understand the origins of the universe" (1984a, p.355). As
I have argued elsewhere (Drees [1987]), the "nothing" in
the "appearance out of nothing" is still "something" with
physical existence, so the first interpretation seems too
strong. A more modest and défendable interpretation is that
this approach "determines the relative probability of
universes corresponding to different classical solutions"
(Hawking [1984a], p.377).
4.2. Time, quantum reality and the end of physics.
Although Hawking agrees that the big bang is an edge
in the standart model, which can be interpreted as "time
began at the Big Bang" ([1984c], 356; [1984d], 12), he is
not satisfied with such an edge. It would mean that there
were boundary conditions needed aside from the laws. In
his model for a universe without boundaries "time ceases to
be well defined in the very early universe just as the
direction "north" ceases to be well defined at the North
Pole of the Earth. ...The quantity that we measure as time
had a beginning, but that does not mean spacetime has an
edge, just as the surface of the Earth does not have an edge
at the North Pole" ([1984c], p.358; [1984d], p. 14).
Hawking defends the absence of an overall arrow of
time, opening an article on this topic with "Physics is time
symmetric" ([1985], 2489). He shows that for his path
integral approach the total wavefunction of the universe has
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the same time-symmetry as those of quantum field theories.
This leaves him with the problem of explaining why "the
Universe that we live in certainly does not appear time
symmetric" ([1985], p.2489). He holds that there are two
arrows of time, the thermodynamic arrow (future =
direction of entropy increase) and the cosmological arrow
(future = direction of expansion of the Universe). He
argued that these two arrows should coincide. Hence, one
would see entropy decreasing in a contracting universe. In
that case the direction of time would be defined the other
way round and there would be again both expansion and
entropy increase. In a "note added in proof" [1985]
Hawking agrees with the conclusion reached by Page [1985]
in the context of Hawking's theory, that the thermodynamic
and the cosmological arrow need not to coincide and so
there is no reversal of the thermodynamic arrow at the
moment of maximum expansion. Although Hawking
maintains that the total wave function must be time
symmetric, it might be that individual classical solutions,
which correspond to components of the wave function, are
not symmetric.
Hawking criticizes Penrose's proposal about the Weyl
curvature for initial singularities as "ad hoc", "putting in
the thermodynamic arrow by hand"; as unclear in the
absence of a theory of quantum gravity; and "Penrose's
proposal does not explain why the cosmological and the
thermodynamic arrows should agree" ([1985], p.2490). The
last criticism lost its force after the "note added in proof".
Besides, Penrose offers an argument why the cosmological
arrow and the thermodynamic arrow concur near initial
singularities: both arise as a consequence of his "new law".
The second objection is correct but holds for all current
theories. It neglects Penrose's related work on the
interpretation of quantum theory and on twisters which is
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in a way an attempt at quantum gravity. The first criticism,
the "ad hoc" character of Penrose's proposal, is circular.
Hawking objects to making a difference between past and
future. This criticism would be correct within Hawking's
program, where the arrow of time is believed to be
something not part of the basic structure of reality, there-
fore following from the theory. However, the criticism
misses the point of Penrose's program. Penrose is
impressed by the asymmetry of time in nature, "one of the
long-standing mysteries of physics" (Penrose [1979], p.
581), an aspect of reality which has escaped physical
description so far. That his theory makes a distinction
between past and future singularities is not surprising; this
is essentially what he is trying to do. Within his view, one
could object to the way time asymmetry is introduced, but
not to the introduction of such an arrow. Hawking's
criticism is from outside, from a different perspective on
the characteristics of reality.
The remark about components of the wave function
brings us to the other issue, the interpretation of quantum
theory. Hawking adhers to the Many Worlds Interpretation,
although he finds the name misleading. It "simply involves
the use of conditional probabilities, that is, the probability
that A will occur given B" ([1984a], p.336). There is no
problem of interpretation "and my attitude to those who
argue about the interpretation of quantum mechanics is
reflected in a paraphrase of Goering's remark: 'When I hear
of Schroedinger's cat, I reach for my gun' "([1984a],
p.337). He applies this interpretation to his wave function
of the universe, which corresponds to a whole family of
classical solutions. In a guantum state that combines two
states peaked around two different classical solutions
"measurements made by the intelligent beings in the first
universe would correspond to the properties of the first
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classical solution and measurements made in the second
universe would correspond to the second solution" ([1984a],
p. 377). The wave function gives the relative probability of
the different classical solutions. This implies that within
such a solution, one cannot doubt its existence. As
Hawking's collaborator Don N. Page said, an observer can
not directly become aware of his "absolute probability (or,
more accurately, measure) of existence" (Page [1985],
p.2498). Hawking stated in his inaugural lecture [1980a]
that "we would have to abandon the view that there is a
unique universe that we observe. Instead, we would have to
adopt a picture in which there was an ensemble of all
possible universes with some probability distribution. This
might explain why the universe started off in the Big Bang
in almost perfect thermal equilibrium, because thermal
equilibrium would correspond to the... greatest probability.
To echo Voltaire's philosopher Pangloss, 'We live in the
most probable of all possible worlds' "([1980a], Boslough
[1985], pp. 145-6). If I understood him correctly, it would
perhaps be even more adequate to say: most probably we
live in the most probable of all possible worlds; we also
live, but less, in the least probable world compatible with
our existence.
The end of physics?
In his 1980 inaugural lecture "Is the End in Sight for
Theoretical Physics" Hawking expressed as his view of the
aim of theoretical physics that it should be both an
explanation of the unique initial conditions and the removal
of arbitrariness (e.g. physical parameters) from the physical
laws. If the boundary conditions for the whole are that
universe has no boundary conditions, "all that we would
then need is a completely consistent theory of quantum
gravity and the other interactions, and we would be able to
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predict everything, at least in principle" ([1984a], 378). He
expects that these laws will be approached by steps, within
a few decades, say from theories of the weak and strong
interactions, through supergravity theories. But complete
predictability is qualified (e.g. in [1980a]) by pointing to
the quantum uncertainty principle and the complexity of the
equations. "Thus we would still be a long way from
Omniscience" ([1984c], p.358; [1984d], p. 14).
5. Discussion.
According to Lakatos science can be described as
consisting of various research programs, series of theories
described by a certain continuity. The continuity is
visualized as a hard core and a positive heuristic. A
program is characterized by its hard core, the set of
hypotheses which are kept fixed. Other hypotheses can be
added or changed according to theoretical or empirical
needs. So in the "protective belt" one finds the major
development within the program. The development is not
haphazard, but quided by a long term research policy, the
"positive heuristic". Theoretical science has a relatively
autonomous development, guided more by the awareness of
the unsatisfactory character of the theory at each moment
than by specific experimental results. And in that theoretical
development mathematics has a central role.
If one looks to the works of Penrose and Hawking with
this scheme of mind one sees that they exhibit these
characteristics of a program. As far as I can see it, they
agree for their hard core in accepting general relativity,
quantum theory and thermodynamics as valid within their
domains, and in accepting the standard cosmological
observations (redshifts, etc.). Hence, they both accept the
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big bang model as valid "after the first fraction of a
second". Therefore, they also agree on the standard
problems of this model, like the need for explanations of
the observed homogeneity and the inhomogeneities in the
universe. They both object to the Kopenhagen interpretation
of quantum physics since the notion of an observer does not
make sense for the universe as a whole and is at odds with
their implicit view of reality. They share the belief in the
need to integrate the different fundamental theories GR,
QT, and thermodynamics.
For Penrose, the specific element in the hard core of
the twistor program is that twisters are the basic entities of
his theories. For Hawking, the Euclidean path-integral
method is, in the context of this work, taken for granted.
However, such "hard core" elements are closely related to
their general view of reality, since the twisters are supposed
to be more basic than points, while the path integral goes
with an attitude which takes all possibilities of reality
seriously.
The differences are most exlicit in their positive
heuristics, especially in preferences, as well as in the
broader background of convictions about reality and about
the attainable level of explanation. Both Penrose and
Hawking use realistic language, implicitly assuming that a
stronger mathematical formalism implies a better
explanation and refers to entities which are closer to the
"deep structure of reality", thereby using an instrumentalist
argument for a realist position. Penrose seems guided by a
belief in the reality of time and of the arrow of time, a
physical difference between past and future. Besides, he has
a strong preference for discrete entities. This shows up in
his objections against the continuum and his long term goal
of a combinatorial formulation of the laws of physics. In
this sense, his approach has a Pythagorean flavor. Penrose
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also allows for unrealized possibilities, as is most clear in
his description of the Creator picking one universe out of
many possibilities. Hawking appears to be guided "sub
specie aeternitatis" by the whole of reality at once, as in the
standard formulations of general relativity. This implies that
time, evolution, novelty, and so on, are mere consequences
of our description from within. What looks like a beginning
of the universe is not one, if seen from the right
perspective. Besides, for Hawking everything that is
possible is also actual, a kind of necessitarianism, while for
Penrose there remains an element of chance, both in his
view of the initial conditions and in his view of reduction
of the state vector in quantum mechanics.
The different programs have partly different problems
to solve. Penrose needs to explain transitions in reality
independent of "observers", having a definite reality avail-
able for macroscopic observers, while Hawking needs to
argue why observers observe a definite universe in stead of
the "real" fuzzy superposition of many states which is his
view of reality. As another example, notice that for Penrose
the question is why the fundamental asymmetry in time is
mostly hidden - in other words, why time-symmetric
physics (Newtonian, general relativistic and quantum
physics) works so well for most phenomena. For Hawking
the apparent asymmetry needs to be explained on the basis
of a symmetric theory and symmetric boundary conditions.
This shows that they also disagree in their view of the data.
For Penrose the asymmetric phenomena are "hard" data, in
need of description and incorporation in the framework of
physics. For Hawking, they are illusions, which have to be
explained away. This difference in perspective show up
clearly in Hawking's criticism of Penrose's introduction of
an arrow of time, a criticism which has its force in one
perspective and not in the other. There is, of course,
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consensus about many implicit criteria of rationality and
good science. However, there is also a difference in
criteria, especially in the more "subjective" ones like what
is aesthetically preferable.
Twistors and path integrals are at first equivalent to
previous approaches, mere reformulations. However, the
relevance of such reformulations is obvious in these two
examples, as they provide different suggestions for what is
mathematically feasible, aesthetically acceptable, and hence
"natural" to do. Besides, they suggest different ways in
which the scheme can be changed, and so might lead to
theories which are no longer equivalent at the next level.
Some equivalence in results is to be expected in any case,
as they both try to encompass the successful standard
theories of general relativity and quantum theory. However,
that might be achieved in quite different conceptual
schemes.
They both presuppose that the unity of nature implies a
unity of description, in this case of quantum and space-time
physics. Hawking states in his inaugural lecture [1980a] that
there are "at least three possibilities", a complete theory, an
infinite sequence of theories, or no theory and no descrip-
tion and prediction beyond a certain limit. The "at least"
makes my speculation about his view less sure, but
apparently he does not take seriously the possibility that
there might be two equally défendable theories or sequences
of theories which are different in their conceptual structure.
A point of philosophical interest might be whether it will be
possible to make a choice on criteria which are acceptable
to both programs. Although they have elements in common,
they might both produce theories which are acceptable
according to those shared criteria, for instance the
reproduction of GR, QT, and thermodynamics in their
respective domains of validity. In that case, the two
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approaches would lead to theories which are empirically
equivalent.
That leaves open two possibilities, either they are in a
more complete sense equivalent, and there might exist ways
of translating the concepts of the one into the other,or they
might be fundamentally different, and so conceptually
(metaphysically, logically) incompatible. For the possibility
of equivalence, one might point to the equivalence in
quantum physics of the wave formalism invented by
Schrödinger and the matrix formalism of Heisenberg or in
general relativity the standard description of space-time as
a four-dimensional whole "at once" and alternatively - at
least in many cases - as a three-dimensional "space"
evolving through time. There are more examples of such
equivalences of approaches which differ in their view of
time. For path integrals the whole path is discussed, while
in using a differential equation and boundary condition one
goes through the history step by step. The evolution of a
system in time can be described by a trajectory in phase-
space, which describes the whole history at once. Might it
be that one could do physics both ways, either "from within
time" or "sub specie aeternitatis"?
Even granted the possibility of these two approaches,
from within time and from outside it, and the existing
examples of "equivalences", it might be that the two
programs discussed in the present article do not produce
theories which are equivalent in such a way. I conjecture
that this is the case, as the differences in their view of time
and its reversability, the nature of quantum reality, and the
initial conditions of the universe are very fundamental. If
the case for this conjecture could be strengthened, the two
programs discussed in this article might be concrete
examples of programs producing theories which are
"logically incompatible and empirically equivalent" (Quine
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1970). To prove this, much more work needs to be done
both on their empirical equivalence and on their logical
incompatibility. If this turns out to be the case, it strongly
supports ideas about "underdetermination", while raising
questions about "critical realism" and all kinds of consensus
and convergence arguments for such realism.
Less problematic is that they both want to go ahead
beyond limitations of the standard theory. Although the
laws of physics break down at singularities, "I do not
believe that physics itself breaks down at a space-time
singularity. It is just that the laws that govern their structure
are presently unknown to us" (Penrose [1986a], p. 137).
The same attitude is also present in Hawking's work, for
instance in his expectation of a complete theory. Using a
distinction made by M.K.Munitz [1974], they seem to hold
both a methodological principle of sufficient reason - one
should seek reasons - and a metaphysical principle of
sufficient reason - there must be such reasons. They even
hold a third one, such reasons are in principle knowable.
Lakatos stated: "One may formulate the "positive
heuristic" of a research program as a "metaphysical"
principle" (Lakatos [1978], 51). In the two cosmological
programs discussed in this article, this is true in a strong
sense. Lakatos uses "'metaphysical' as a technical term of
naive falsificationism: a contingent proposition is
'metaphysical if it has no 'potential falsifiers'"(Lakatos
[1978], p.47, n.2). In the examples discussed in the present
article, the ideas are not only "metaphysical" in the sense
that their guiding ideas are from within each program
beyond dispute, but also metaphysical in the stronger
classical sense, as they are about issues like the relation
between actual and potential existence, the nature of space
and time, discrete entities or continua, contingency or
necessity of the Universe.
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Notes
1. Although this article discusses only work of Penrose and Hawking, there are many
others contributing to the same programs. Besides, there are other programs - or more
diffuse activities - as well. However, Penrose and Hawking are two key figures in their
programs and their programs are major contributions to contemporary discussions in
scientific cosmology, as could easily be shown from the Science Citation Index and
conference proceedings.
2. Spin networks, spinors and twistors can be found in articles by Penrose from 1959,
1960, 1967, 1968, and elsewhere, conformai transformations were discussed in 1963,
1964a, 1964b.
3. The first presentation of the relation between the Weyl curvature and time-asymmetry
that I came across was at a conference in Pakistan in 1976, Penrose 11977). The relation
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between time-asymmetry and the structure of singularities was conjectured in public in
1973, Penrose [1974].
4. To get a feeling how large the number involved is: to write it down, using only one
elementary particle for each zero, even a trillion times the total amount of particles in the
observable universe would be insufficient.
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